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The Power of “the Few”:
A Key Strategic Challenge for the Permanently Disrupted High-
Tech Homeland Security Environment
Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez
To a greater degree than at any point in history, individuals and small groups—from 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on the one hand to criminal networks and terrorist 
organizations on the other—have the ability to engage the world with far-reaching effects, 
including those that are disruptive and destructive.
-First Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 2009
ABSTRACT
This article argues  for a new  organizational 
approach to homeland security,  designed to 
confront the challenges  of a highly  disrupted 
environment in a more  efficient way. 
Initially,  it explains  how  the accelerating 
pace of innovation creates a set of homeland 
security  challenges that empower small 
groups  or individuals  – “the few” – in new 
a n d u n p r e d i c t a b l e w a y s . N e x t ,  i t 
d e m o n s t r a t e s w h y t h e  c u r r e n t 
organizational model for homeland security 
is systemically  insufficient to respond to this 
permanently disrupted environment, despite 
the best efforts of its  members. This  is  done 
by dividing the  homeland security duties 
into  two distinct missions: an incremental or 
“systemic mission” and a disruptive or 
“future shock  mission.” The current 
institutional model is  seemingly well 
adapted to  respond to  the needs  of the first 
mission but ineffective to address  the  second. 
Lastly,  the article  proposes  a new  homeland 
security institutional model,  better adapted 
to  confront the negative effects  of disruption 
by fostering and harnessing the positive 
ones. This is accomplished by adapting Alvin 
Toffler’s concept of “adhocracy” to homeland 
security’s  needs and using DARPA as  an 
example of a successful “adhocratic” and 
disruptive security and defense institution. 
INTRODUCTION
The task  of defining a  homeland security 
environment  is tricky.  Framing  it  seems like 
an  invitation to oversimplify  its nature as a 
series of elements that  can be fitted into a 
tightly  packaged description  that might look 
elegant, but also provides us with  a  false 
sense of linear  order and predictability  for 
what  it  is in  reality  an  interactive,  complex, 
and evolving  web of forces, constraints, 
incentives, and conditions. 
This article will first describe how  the 
current pace of technological progress 
perpetuates the chaotic nature of the 
homeland security  environment and 
maintains it  in  a  permanent  state of 
disruption.   This has given birth  to a  new 
phenomenon  that I call  “the power  of the 
few,” where technology  has lowered the 
barriers to entry  for disruption, both  positive 
and negative,  thus creating  the need for a 
new  kind of security  strategy  to prevent 
innovation  and freedom  being  turned against 
the legitimate users of social  and physical 
infrastructure.  I conclude with  an  exploration 
of the limits of the current homeland security 
institutional framework to adapt  to this 
rapid ly  evo lv ing  and unpredic table 
environment,  and propose a new  strategic 
approach  to homeland security,  based on  the 
different  natures of incremental  and 
disruptive threats, to counter more effectively 
the negative effect of the power of the few.
Whereas the normal approach  to 
describing an  environment  for  strategic 
purposes is to think  of it  as a  static 
abstraction  of reality,  akin to the chessboard 
where players distribute their  pieces and 
make their  moves (think  of a battle map,  as 
shown in  Figure 1),  a  social  environment  for 
public policy  is not  a  snapshot  frozen  in  time, 
but a mutating  context  in  which people 
operate and interact  with  each  other  and with 
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the natural and man-made structures that 
surround them, and each  interaction  morphs 
a  little  bit  the state of the system. It is more 
an ecosystem than a photograph.
Figure 1. Cartographic representation of Operation Overlord strategic plan.1
A s s u c h , t h e h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
environment  should be understood as a 
chaotic  system  where long  term  planning  is 
very  difficult  and forecasting  is in  reality 
impossible. As Levy  explains it, “chaos 
systems do not reach  a  stable equilibrium; 
indeed, they  can  never  pass through the same 
exact state more than once.”  Therefore,  “we 
cannot learn  too much about  the future by 
studying the past: if history  is the sum  of 
complex and nonlinear  interactions among 
people and nations,  then history  does not 
repeat  itself.” 2  Trend analysis,  the basis of 
most forecasting  based planning, is not a 
useful tool to plan and prepare against  future 
disruptive threats because that previously 
mentioned metaphorical chessboard will  not 
have the same number  of squares twice, and 
the pieces constantly  change the way  they 
move.3
Secretary  of Defense Robert  Gates 
described the limitations of forecasting  for 
defense, strategy, and war:
We can’t know with  absolute certainty what 
the future of  warfare will  hold but we do 
know it will  be exceedingly complex, 
unpredictable, and – as they say in  the staff 
colleges – “unstructured.”  ... And I must 
tell  you, when  it comes to predicting the 
nature and location  of  our  next military 
engagements, since Vietnam, our record 
has been  perfect. We have never  once 
gotten it right.4
HERACLITUS AND ASIMOV WERE 
RIGHT
In  Cratylus, Plato imagines a  dialogue where 
Heraclitus expresses: “all  things are in 
motion  and nothing  at rest...[it  is] like the 
stream  of a  river  ...  that  you  cannot  go into 
the same water  twice.5  Isaac  Asimov,  the 
science fiction  writer,  updated the quote: “It 
is change, continuing  change,  inevitable 
change, that is the dominant factor  in  society 
today. No sensible  decision can  be made any 
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longer without  taking  into account  not  only 
the world as it is, but the world as it will be.” 6
That  is why  trying to describe  the current 
state of the homeland security  environment  is 
a  flawed approach to developing  a  strategy, 
mainly  because the current  state is just  an 
instant in  the evolution of this complex  and 
randomized system.  Instead,  I will  focus on 
d e m o n s t r a t i n g  h o w  s c i e n t i f i c  a n d 
technological  progress (two of the main 
m o t i v a t i o n a l f o r c e s f o r  s o c i e t a l 
transformations)  have accelerated the pace of 
this evolution,  reducing  in  the process the 
“shelf life”  of some of the security  paradigms 
and doctrines that condition  the reactions of 
our  institutions in  the homeland security 
environment.  This accelerated pace implies a 
change of scale that empowers small groups. 
Over  the last  century,  radical technological 
changes have disrupted the human 
environment  in  profound and permanent 
ways.  In this very  short amount of time, a 
100-year-old person  alive in 2011  would have 
witnessed the arrival of the power  grid, the 
te lephone gr id ,  the mass produced 
automobile and the interstate highway 
system,  radio broadcasting,  television,  the 
cell phone network (first  transmitting  only 
voice and then voice and data), the computer 
and, of course, the Internet. None of these 
technologies that  shape and sustain  the 
human ecosystem  today  were generally 
available the day he was born. 
In  those same 100  years, new  techniques 
and construction  materials have reshaped 
our  urban environment.  Reinforced concrete 
and the steel frame allowed us to build 
higher, giving  birth  to the modern  skyscraper 
and opening the door to a new  level of urban 
concentration.  Paradoxically,  stronger and 
more flexible infrastructures (dams, 
pipelines, power  plants, the grid, tunnels, 
bridges,  highways,  and airports) gave us the 
capacity  to locate  people and resources over 
much  greater  distances than  before,  enabling 
a technological urban sprawl.
This contemporary  urban environment is 
dependent on  technological  infrastructure 
operating  unceasingly. As Weisman’s 
provocative narrative describes, it  would take 
less than  a  week  without  functioning 
infrastructure for  places like New  York  City  to 
start a process of rapid decay. 7  
Because of innovations in transportation 
and information  technologies,  the rapport  of 
the individual with  space also suffered 
multiple disruptions and our  environment 
has “shrunk.”  Low  transportation  costs made 
possible unrestricted and rapid travel to 
almost  anywhere in  the world for  less than 
one thousand dollars using  the global  civilian 
aviation  network, and provided the ability  to 
ship any  product anywhere for  just a few 
hundred dollars.  This modified our  relation 
with  time,  as spatial  processes that used to 
take months – like sending a  shipment across 
the world,  traveling,  or  sending a  letter  – can 
now  be accomplished in  days for  what  used to 
take months,  and instantly  for  what it  used to 
take days. The grace period that  societies 
used to enjoy  to prepare for  a disruption 
coming from  overseas no longer  exists,  or  at 
least  it  has been greatly  reduced.  Disruptions 
not only  can travel far  and cheap,  they  can 
also travel fast.
Lastly, our  relationship with  the working 
and productive environment  also endured 
important changes that  affect the way  we deal 
with  technological innovation.  In the last  100 
years high  tech societies have become 
postindustrial,8 and knowledge creation  has 
replaced manufacturing  as the main added 
v a l u e f o r e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h , w i t h 
consequences for every production sector.  
The food industry  operates today  in  an 
e n v i r o n m e n t  w h e r e ,  t h a n k s t o 
agrotechnology,  produce is abundant and 
easily  transported from  its source to the 
consumer. In  this high-tech  environment, 
less than  4  percent of the population of any 
given  developed country  can  grow  enough 
food to feed all  its inhabitants and still  sell an 
“exportable surplus.” 9  Furthermore, the 
primary  sector is being disrupted by  the 
recently  gained knowledge of how  genetics 
work  and how  genes can  be converted into 
information  and manipulated digitally, 10 
freeing genetic  scientists from  the physical 
limits of Mendelian inheritance. 11 
Regarding  the secondary  sector,  affordable 
energy,  robotics,  and outsourced cheap labor 
made possible by  communication  and 
transportation  technologies have made dull 
and repet i t ive manufactur ing  tasks 
unprofitable and undesirable inside the labor 
environments of most  high-income nations, 
forcing  their  citizens into more information 
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driven  endeavors.  In  fact, this labor 
environment  has seen  “a  huge increase in  the 
number  of people paid to think  or  talk, rather 
than  produce or  transport  objects.” 12 That  is, 
people are being paid for  their  capacity  to 
produce and manage information (granted, 
not all  of it  creative)  and not for  their 
muscles,  thus multiplying as a  result  the 
amount  of knowledge that  can  be recombined 
and therefore the potential for  disruption 
( v o l u n t a r y  o r  i n v o l u n t a r y ) o f t h e 
environment in cumulative way. 
This takes us to the two main  patterns that 
govern our  innovation  and security 
environment  and are to blame for  the 
emergence of the phenomenon  of the “power 
of the few.” 
 The first one has to do with  the 
cumulative, combinatorial,  evolving and 
unpredictable behavior  of the system: waves 
of new  technologies lay  the foundations for 
the next  technologies with  cross-pollination 
d u r i n g  t h e s a m e w a v e .  S o m e n e w 
technologies,  like  the printing  press and the 
combustion  engine,  have ripple  disruptive 
effects across many  domains, and affect 
security  in  many  ways. Others are just 
incremental  upgrades from  previous 
technologies and security  strategies do not 
need to be altered.  Nonetheless, all  new 
technologies inherit  some elements from 
previous generations of scientific discovery 
and technological  advances.  While this 
process can  be traced back in  time,  in what 
Bryan  Arthur  denominated “Combinatorial 
evolution,” he also concluded:
[Modern technology  is now] becoming an 
open language for the creation of structures 
and functions in the economy… shifting 
from technologies that produced fixed 
physical  outputs to technologies whose 
main  character  is that they can  be 
combined and configured endlessly for 
fresh  purposes. Technology, once a  means 
of production, is becoming a chemistry.”13 
So, the first  pattern  exhibited by  the 
system  is that  technological environments 
evolve in  a  combinatorial  way,  and modern 
technology  has made recombination, 
including convergence, simpler. For  example, 
when  material products are transformed into 
binary  data, they  can  be manipulated with 
little to no associated manufacturing  cost.  As 
Chris Anderson  points out, “once something 
becomes software,  it  inevitably  becomes free 
– in  cost, certainly, and often  in  price.” 14 
Products that  used to be “things”  are today 
binary  code: music  CDs or  LPs, VHS tapes or 
DVDs,  typewri ters ,  so l i ta i re decks , 
blueprints,  calculators,  libraries full  of books, 
office files,  medical  test  results, genetic 
strings, to cite just a  few.  While this 
convergence might  seem  today  logical  and 
understandable, just a few  years ago (before 
the computer  era) it would have been  difficult 
to find something linking  medical research 
and film distribution. 
The second key  pattern  derivates from  the 
first  one.  As part  of this evolution  and the 
iterative learning  process that  comes with  it, 
technology  gets cheaper  and better  with time 
incrementally.  Any  early  adopter  of 
technology  has witnessed this phenomenon 
when, after  a  few  generations,  his or  her  first 
generation  model has become an  obsolete 
object  that  cost  twice as much as the new 
model. This kind of innovation  was baptized 
“sustaining”  by  Clayton  Christensen. In  his 
words,  sustaining  technologies "improve the 
performance of established products.”  But he 
also recognized that  sometimes “disruptive” 
technologies emerge.  They  bring  to “a  market 
[I would say  to the security  environment] a 
very  different value proposition  than  had 
been available previously.” 15 
So, for  the purposes of this article, the 
second important  environmental 
pattern  is that innovation brings change to 
the system  e i ther  incrementa l ly  or 
disruptively.  Incremental  improvements of 
existing mainstream  technologies makes 
them  better  and cheaper,  but disruptive 
innovation  can and often  does change the 
environment  in  unexpected ways,  disrupting 
(hence the name) the rules that  governed 
what seemed, for a while, a stable ecosystem. 
Disruptive technologies are the ones that 
normally  modify  the physical  qualities of our 
environment and more importantly, the 
fabric  of our  technologically  dependent 
civilization.  For  example,  the combustion 
engine not  only  replaced the horse as the 
main human  means of transportation,  it  also 
completely  disrupted the way  humans 
interact  with  their  urban  space, making 
modern  cities and suburban  sprawl possible; 
this created new  conditions and constraints 
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for  spatial planning. It  also created new  social 
vulnerabilities and risks,  as the thousands of 
road fatalities per  year  demonstrate, 
catapulting  accidents – in  less than  a  century 
– to the fifth  leading  cause of death  in  the 
United States and creating  the need for  a 
highway safety and security strategy.16 
Technological innovation is a natural 
consequence of scientific  progress.  Every 
time a new  phenomenon is understood or, to 
use Brian  Arthur’s words, every  time a 
phenomenon  or  effect  is “harnessed”  by 
science, it  can be exploited by  technology.17 
Then, market  forces and human behavior 
normally  determine how  and if these new 
technologies will  be assimilated and become 
a permanent part of the environment.18 
 Each  new  technology  that we adopt 
creates new  structural  vulnerabilities.  As Ted 
Lewis points out “highly  technological 
societies are vulnerable because they  depend 
heavily  on  technology.” 19  The more 
technology  we use,  the more potential 
vulnerabilities there are.  Because technology 
now  has such a  high  level of combinatorial 
complexity, it can  safely  be said that the 
environment  has reached a  state where the 
periods of stability  between disruptions are 
short  lived (certainly  shorter  than  before), 
and we should assume that disruption is the 
permanent default state.  
You  cannot  go to the same water  twice, 
and when the water  reaches the ocean,  the 
shape of its breaking waves cannot be 
predicted. Change is indeed the main  factor 
of society  today.  Therefore,  the current 
mutating  environment encourages disruptive 
participation of small groups of new  actors 
that,  until recently, had not  enough  resources 
to achieve disruption  on  a global scale. 
Because of the two previously  described 
environmental patterns (the combinatorial 
evolution  of the technological environment 
and the intr insic  character ist ics of 
“sustaining”  and “disruptive”  technologies), 
the scale has been  altered to favor  the small 
groups I refer  to as “the few,”  and away  from 
big organizations or  governments that  used 
to hold a  monopoly  on  system  based 
disruption.  
THE POWER OF THE FEW:
A 2001 ‘CELL’ HAS THE SIZE OF A 
1941 EMPIRE
On September 11,  2001,  “a  few” hijackers 
were able to bring  to a  halt  the entire nation, 
cripple the economy,  place continuity  of 
government  at  risk and inflict  more than 
3000  casualties. The only  other  occasion 
when  the United States suffered comparable 
loses from  a  single attack was during Pearl 
Harbor,  when  the combined fleet  of six 
carrier  battle  groups (the Kido Butai) backed 
by  the full power  of the Japanese Empire was 
deployed to accomplish a similar result.
In  2001, a cell  of nineteen hijackers did 
what  only  a  powerful empire could do in 
1941. 
How  is it possible that  a twenty-first 
century  cell has been empowered to provoke 
the same kind of damage as a  twentieth 
century empire?  
The more technologies we integrate 
incrementally  into our  society’s environment, 
t h e m o r e o p t i o n s o r  c h o i c e s f o r 
recombination  are created, and the more 
unforeseeable vulnerabilities appear. New 
technologies have commoditized certain key 
resources needed to affect  the environment 
on  a  global scale. In  addition, the expensive 
physical infrastructure that  was formerly 
required to do this has often  been  replaced by 
technologies that can  be modified and 
recombined without heavy  machinery  and big 
factories.   
The Quadrennial Defense Review  of 2010 
explicitly  recognized this as one of the key 
sources for  uncertainty  in  the current security 
ecosystem: 
Globalization has transformed the process 
of technological innovation while lowering 
entry barriers for  a  wider range of  actors to 
acquire advanced technologies. As 
technological innovation and global 
information flows accelerate, non-state 
actors [the  few] will  continue to gain 
influence and capabilities that, during the 
past century, remained largely  the purview 
of states.20
It is no longer  true that technological 
innovation  requires a heavy  investment to 
manipulate nature and produce a  result 
capable of having an impact in  the real world, 
NIETO-GOMEZ, POWER OF THE FEW  6
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 7, ARTICLE 18 (DECEMBER 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
as when  most technology  represented a 
tangible  single-purpose achievement, 
designed to obtain a  specific  desired effect.  In 
the past,  the pace of disruption was limited 
by  the constraints of the physical world and 
as such,  disruption  moved more slowly  and 
was more expensive than  it  is now. Today, 
technology  is cheaper  to create,  easier  to 
recombine,  and more integrated in  our  social 
environment; because of this,  the barriers to 
entry  for  achieving  world wide disruption 
have been reduced. 
The price of the transistor,  backbone of 
the current computing  paradigm  and 
essential to recombining technology, has 
shrunk exponentially  since the 1960s,21 and 
computing  power  has become accessible to 
everybody  for  many  purposes. As a 
consequence, digital technology  has invaded 
our  environment, replacing  in  many 
instances the single purpose “moving  parts” 
that  existed before.  The digital world serves 
as a  common  denominator  for  an  enormous 
number  of social and natural  phenomena  and 
directly  affects the analog  (i.e.  the “real”) 
world: anything  that  can be transformed into 
binary  data  can  be processed digitally  and 
recombined with  other seemingly  unrelated 
phenomena, all for  a  marginal cost  that 
quickly approaches zero. 
We have assimilated into our  innovation 
landscape some of the positive consequences 
of this new  phenomenon. Nowadays,  some 
independent  blogs have a  readership as large 
(or  larger) than  established newspapers with 
more editorial influence and without the need 
for  expensive presses or  distribution 
channels.22  Small  groups of entrepreneurs 
were capable of creating  “garage startups” 
that  became big  multibillion household 
names like Apple,  Microsoft  or  Google, 
mainly  selling  a  programmable idea  without 
the initial requirement  of large industrial 
capacity. The original capital needed to 
jumpstart  these companies was in  the 
hundreds of thousands rather  than millions 
of dollars.
Grassroots movements of loosely 
interconnected individuals (at  the left  and 
right  of the political spectrum) have been 
emerging  around the world,  using Web 2.0 
tools to transform  political landscapes 
without the need for  cumbersome party 
b u r e a u c r a c i e s , b u t a l s o w i t h  n e w 
vulnerabilities hardwired into their  structure 
because of their  need to communicate 
online. 23   
Aggregators like Wikipedia  have started to 
take advantage of the fragmented knowledge 
and the free unstructured time of millions of 
individuals,  who are willing  to donate this 
time “just  for  fun,”  capitalizing  on what  Clay 
Shirky  calls an  enormous and yet  unexploited 
cognitive surplus.24 This effort  has created a 
source of information  many  times bigger  than 
any  physical library, accessible from 
anywhere where there is an  Internet 
connection.  This dematerialized knowledge 
distribution is leveling  the information  field, 
independently  of how  far people are  from  the 
cultural centers.  It  might be true that 
Wikipedia  is the result of the work of many 
thousands of volunteers working  together, 
but thanks to aggregation  and crowd sourcing 
technology, this is done at  the individual level 
(the scale of the few) replacing  big centralized 
teams. 
As all the previous examples demonstrate, 
global consequences for  the actions of small 
g r o u p s o f i n d i v i d u a l s h a v e b e e n 
commoditized to the extreme.  There is one 
last example that  is more dramatic  than any 
other: Thanks to computer  modeling, geo-
engineering  projects to alter  weather patterns 
are now  within  reach  of wealthy  individuals 
like former  Microsoft  CEO William  Gates.25 
In  2008 (well  before Gates announced that 
he had any  interest  in  funding  this kind of 
projects) David Victor  wrote “a  lone 
Greenfinger,  self-appointed protector  of the 
planet  and working with  a  small fraction  of 
Gates bank account,  could force a  lot  of geo-
engineering  on  his own.  Bond films of the 
future might  struggle with  the dilemma of 
unilateral planetary engineering.” 26 
Current technologies make it  possible for 
small groups of individuals (“the few”  or “the 
one”) to alter Earth’s weather  patterns.  This 
is the degree of change in  the scale  for 
disruption: one person,  financing  a  “few”,  can 
change the planet,  and not only  in  a 
metaphorical way.  In  less than fifty  years, 
individual disruption  potential  has reached a 
global scale. 
In  the 1970s, Alvin Toffler  coined the term 
“future shock”  to describe the effects of rapid 
and accelerating changes in  society.27  In  his 
words, 
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The rate of  change has implications quite 
apart from, and sometimes more important 
than, the directions of  change. No attempt 
to understand adaptivity can  succeed until 
this fact is  grasped. Any  attempt to define 
the “content” of  change must include the 
consequences of pace itself as part  of that 
content.28
In this rapidly  changing  environment, 
where consecutive waves of disruptive 
technologies are reshaping  society  faster  than 
it  can  adapt  to the last  wave,  the small and 
unstructured “few”  are capable of adapting  to 
the pace of change faster  than  vertical 
organizations or  big  governments.  As this is a 
tool-based phenomenon,  and tools have no 
morals or  ethics,  the “power  of the few”  can 
be moral or immoral, legal or illegal.
Without the proper  countermeasures, 
small groups (i.e.,  terrorist  cells, gangs or 
cartels) or  even  just  lone individuals (e.g., 
skilled hackers), have a  new  capacity  to inflict 
damage, fear,  and death due to potential 
access to the same tools that also empower 
p o s i t i v e b e h a v i o r  a n d s u s t a i n  o u r 
technologically dependent environment.
The implications of this are fundamental 
for  homeland security’s strategic culture. 
New  technologies,  especially  disruptive 
technologies,  come with  new  recombining 
potential. Because “the few”  have better 
adaptivity  than  “the many,”  small groups can 
take advantage of unforeseen  consequences 
of the new  altered environment  more rapidly 
than  authorities can  identify  a  new  potential 
threat and react  to it.  Convergence of 
different technologies makes this a  multi-
l a y e r e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y , b e y o n d j u s t 
information  technology  risks. For  example: 
human  beings outfitted with  Life Critical 
Implantable Medical Devices ,  (e .g . , 
p a c e m a k e r s , d e f i b r i l l a t o r s o r 
neurostimulators) have potentially  become 
“hackable”  targets. Most of the new  versions 
of these lifesaving  devices are activated and 
deactivated via  wireless protocols and “the 
lack  of authentication and integrity 
mechanisms put  patients at risk  from  attack 
by  anyone with  a  transmitter.” 29 Without  the 
proper  countermeasure,  “the few”  might 
conceivably  be empowered to literally  stop a 
heart  or a  mind by  just  thinking about  it  (and 
programming the proper code).
The permanently  disrupted environment 
cannot and should not  be reversed,  as its 
positive effects far  outweigh  its negative 
implications. In  those places where,  in  the 
last 200  years,  science and technology  have 
become permanent  fixtures of the social 
landscape, quality  of life and security  are 
greater  than  ever. As Indur  Goklany  explains 
in his thoroughly  researched book, 
meaningful  indicators like  hunger,  infant 
mortality,  life expectancy, education, political 
rights and the UN “human development 
index”  are all  positively  affected by  the 
presence of “unparalleled technological 
change, which  has transformed the world 
more in  the past  two centuries than  all  the 
other events put together  since the beginning 
of agriculture 10 millennia ago.”   He then 
p o i n t s o u t : “ E c o n o m i c g r o w t h  a n d 
technological change have redefined the role 
of women and children,  restructured the 
w o r k p l a c e , u n d e r m i n e d a g e - o l d 
arrangements of caste and class, expanded 
the middle  class,  and developed new 
institutions and organizations.” 30
A  policy  that would try  to stop innovation 
and progress in the name of security  would 
also be immoral,  as it  would do more harm 
than  good by  denying  solutions to some of 
our  most  pressing  problems.  It  would also 
would be Orwellian, as it  would transform  the 
creativity  and imagination of innovators into 
“thoughtcrimes”  punishable by  law. The 
suppression  of technology  has rarely  if ever 
been  proved to be an  effective strategy.31 
Instead,  we need a security  strategy  designed 
to protect the safety  of “the many”  from  this 
recently  acquired power  of “the few,”  while at 
the same time preserving the technological 
tools needed to unleash  innovation  and 
entrepreneurial creativity. 
A  high-tech  environment is also a target-
r i c h  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  w h e r e s o c i e t y ’ s 
infrastructure is not only  vulnerable to 
sabotage – it  can  even be "i l l icit ly 
appropriated,”32  by  clandestine actors, and 
turned against its legitimate users.  Even  the 
consequences of natural disasters are worse 
today  because of our  social  dependency  on 
technological infrastructure in dense 
population  centers.33  As Mitchell and 
Townsend observe: 
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By  bringing  down  the networks it depends 
upon, a city  can be killed. Those networks 
can  also be hijacked and turned against 
their creators  delivering destruction  by 
appropriating  the very  transfer  and 
distribution  capability that motivated their 
construction  … for  an  attacker  it can  be a 
better strategy to exploit, rather than 
destroy, an  enemy’s networks. If  access to 
large-scale network can  be gained, it 
eliminates  the need to expend a  lot of effort 
and energy  to get  to them. It isn’t even 
necessary  to possess comparable forces. 
Violence and destruction  can  be delivered 
with  modest means but  pinpoint accuracy, 
by  inf i l t rat ing or h i jack ing those 
networks.34 
Furthermore ,  complex  networked 
environments like the ones previously 
described tend to self-organize critically, 
injecting  a  degree of randomness into the 
security  landscape in  which, as Lewis points 
out,  catastrophe is hard to avoid: “A  small 
(random) perturbation  in  these systems can 
trip a  major  collapse,  unexpectedly, 
dramatically,  and resoundingly. Because the 
cause is not  obvious (until after  the fact),  and 
it  is often  a  very  minor perturbation, the 
collapse comes as a shock.” 35
On 9/11,  the illicit  appropriation  of the 
civilian  aviation  network  was catastrophically 
recombined with  the steel frame of the 
skyscrapers in  a  very  disruptive way,  to 
circumvent  the security  systems of the 
continental United States. Basically,  on  that 
day, the United States of America  was hacked 
by a terrorist cell.
While homeland security  has been 
redefining the role of the state in  the fight 
against asymmetrical  attacks, the current 
strategy  has structural  limitations in  its 
capacity  to deal  with  “out of the box” 
vulnerabilities created by  our  dependence on 
new  technologies and the accelerated pace of 
technological change. A  new  strategy  capable 
of taking  advantage of this disrupted 
environment  is urgently  needed for  our  era, 
as the  acceleration  changes in  new 
technologies – like bio or  nanotechnology, 
robotics and geo-engineering – means the 
clandestine “few”  can  find new  possibilities 
every  day  to appropriate more systems, 
recombining them in unforeseeable ways.
No traditional, slow  reacting  bureaucracy 
is agile enough  to respond to this challenge, 
and the current homeland secur i ty 
institutional  model is no exception. 
Therefore,  I argue here that  a  new 
organizational  change to America’s homeland 
security  institutions is needed to prepare 
them  to be proactive  actors in  this disrupted 
high-tech environment.  
THE LIMITS OF CURRENT HOMELAND 
SECURITY’S ADAPTABILITY TO DISRUPTION
How  can  a  traditional security  bureaucracy 
react to this permanently  disrupted 
environment  of innovation  and fast paced 
technological  evolution? How  can a  big 
enterprise made of bureaucratic  institutions 
composed in  their  turn  of hundreds of 
thousands of individuals,  respond to the new 
vulnerabilities and threats posed by 
disruptive multipurpose technologies that 
raise, recombine and fall  in  cycles measured 
in  months and not  years, empowering  the 
adaptable few in unexpected ways?
The answer is that it simply cannot. 
To understand why  and what choices are 
available to defend society’s freedoms in  this 
innovative but  unstable landscape, it  is 
essential to consider  two key  determinants 
regarding  the current nature of the threat and 
how  homeland security  institutions are 
expected to confront  this threat  with a  two-
pronged approach.
The first essential determinant  is that 
while terrorism  should be a  big part  of any 
current asymmetrical threat  assessment  – if 
only  because it  is the tactic  of choice not  just 
of the weak,  but  also of the clandestine few 
(while they  are more adaptable than  the 
many, they  are not always weaker)  – the 
narrow  framework of terrorist  conduct  does 
not suffice to describe the homeland security 
threat  posed by  the few. Most institutional 
definitions of terrorism  concur  that  one of the 
main elements of any  terrorist’s conduct is 
the motivation  behind the calculated use of 
violence. 36  Whether  this motivation  is 
political, religious,  or  ideological, the terrorist 
act  has to be  oriented to modify  the conduct 
or  policy  of a  government. Yet,  in  a 
permanently  disrupted environment,  what 
defines the threat  posed by  the few  has less to 
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do with  the motivation  than  with  the 
employed means. 
The new  vulnerabilities of this high  tech 
society  make motivation  irrelevant.  Whether 
a  critical  infrastructure is sabotaged or 
illicitly  appropriated to pursue a  political or 
religious agenda, to look for  personal gain, to 
just prove that it  can be hacked, 37 or  even  by 
accident,  the catastrophic consequences for 
“the many” are the same. 
In  that sense, homeland security’s 
response to the power of “the few”  has to shift 
its focus beyond motivation  to the means. To 
phrase it  differently, not  all homeland 
security  threats will  be terrorist attacks per se 
(i.e.  politically, religiously  or  ideologically 
motivated acts designed to affect the 
government’s policies), nor  will  all  homeland 
security  adversaries will be traditional 
terrorists. Nevertheless, understanding  how  a 
technology  can  be sabotaged, penetrated, or 
illicitly  appropriated to harm  society’s 
interests can be achieved independently  of 
the motivations of the adversarial actor, 38 
and a “homeland security  response”  can be 
preemptively  deployed to address this 
technological risk. 
Without  question,  confronting the 
underlying causes which  incite a  particular 
group of “the few”  to try  to do harm  to “the 
many”  must  be an  important  and permanent 
objective of the entire nation  and not  just  of 
the homeland security  enterprise.  These 
causes can  be diverse and are often beyond 
the reach  of any  security  policy.  Issues like 
international Islamist  radicalization, 
domestic racism  and xenophobia,  organized 
crime, radical rejection  of the federal 
authority,  bullying  and social rejection  in 
American  schools and colleges,  to name just a 
few, are all social problems for  which  a 
solution  has to be actively  pursued.  However, 
a  security  and defense policy  that would try 
to address all underlying  causes would be 
diluted in its diversity  and faulty  in  its means, 
since these and other asymmetrical sources 
of conflict, almost with  the only  exception  of 
international state sponsored terrorism,  are 
not  at the outset  a  security  or  defense 
problem, but a  social  one. Consequently, 
responding to these sources of conflict  is a 
mission  for  a  nation, not  for  a security 
strategy.
The second determinant is that  we 
demand from  homeland security  institutions 
(composed of more than  just  the Department 
of Homeland Security) a  two-pronged 
approach, shaped by  two seemingly  opposing 
missions.  On  the one hand, these agencies are 
supposed to manage an organizational 
system  of systems using  standardized 
procedures and best  practices to prevent 
known kinds of vulnerabilities in  our  high 
tech  environment.  When  a  traveler  removes 
his or  her  shoes to be x-rayed by  the 
Transportation  Security  Administration 
(TSA) before boarding  a  plane,  this 
bureaucracy  is applying  a  continuous security 
layer designed to counteract a  known  security 
vulnerability.  On  the other  hand,  homeland 
security  institutions are supposed to 
“connect”  the proverbial dots to anticipate all 
the threats and vulnerability  scenarios that 
have not  yet happened,  might  never  happen, 
but are morphing  rapidly  because of the 
complex  nature of the of recombining 
technologies (old and new), and then  patch 
the security  holes, before clandestine actors 
can exploit them.
Both  missions are critically  important, but 
their  relation  to innovation  and therefore to 
the power of the few  is very  different.  The 
difference resides in  the previously  explained 
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  s u s t a i n i n g  o r 
incremental  technologies and disruptive 
technologies.  The first mission, that  I will call 
here the “systemic  mission,”  deals with 
sustaining  threats.  In contrast, the second 
one,  the “future shock  mission,”  is supposed 
to neutralize disruptive – almost random  – 
threats posed by  the rapid pace of 
technological evolution. These differences are 
key  to understanding  homeland security’s 
successes and “failures,”  and to establishing 
an  alternative strategy  to adapt to this 
complex ecosystem.
Contrary  to what one might think,  the 
majority  of potential threats against our  high 
tech  society  are incremental  and not 
disruptive in  nature. A  bomb used against  a 
soft transportation  target  like  a  subway  train 
or  a  bus (Madrid 2004  or  London 2005),  for 
example,  is a  well-rehearsed and well-proven 
method. It  has happened many  times before 
and it  will  probably  be tried again with  just 
small incremental innovations to adapt  it to 
the precise conditions of the chosen scenario 
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(i.e.,  size of the bomb depending on  the 
target,  method of concealment, etc.).  The 
same thing  can be said about  the suicide 
bomber  in  a  highly  dense urban  setting, the 
Columbine copycats, the car  bombing  of 
public  buildings,  and airplane bombings 
(such  as the Pan-Am  103  bombing  of 1988, 
the failed attempts of the so-called shoe 
bomber  in  2001,  and the Christmas bomber 
in 2009).
From  the point of view  of technology, 
these are all  sustaining  threats made possible 
by  the sabotage or  destruction of critical 
infrastructure,  exploiting  known  security 
holes that  are difficult  to close in  open  and 
technologically  dependent  societies. It  is for 
these kinds of hazards that  a  bureaucracy  is 
needed to manage,  maintain, and ameliorate 
a  system  designed to neutralize  incremental, 
known threats. An organizational  approach  is 
essential for  this systemic mission, as most  of 
the known security  deficiencies can  be 
corrected through  standardized measures 
and “best  practices,”  which  create a  more 
secure process for  the technology  user  and 
ultimately  for  society.  While in  some cases 
budget  constraints or  civil liberties issues 
might  limit  the full spectrum  of choices for 
the policymaker,  forcing  him  or  her  to 
imagine disruptive alternatives to solve an 
otherwise incremental problem, in  general 
the mission can  be handled well by  an 
efficient security bureaucracy.
As Henry  Mintzberg and others point out: 
“the key  to strategic management,  therefore, 
is to sustain  stability  or  at  least  adaptable 
strategic  change most  of the time, but 
periodically  to recognize the need for 
transformation and be able to manage that 
disruptive process without  destroying  the 
organization.” 39 
Bureaucracies are good organizations for 
managing  iterative processes that are subject 
to continuous improvement loops and must 
be executed every  time in  the same way, 
independently  of the specific individual who 
takes care  of the task any  given  day.  They  are 
the best  solution  to the problem  of 
maintaining  the same level of quality  in  a 
repetitive process. 
Figure 2. Iterative feedback loop of the homeland security Risk Management Framework. 40
In  fact, because of the iterative nature of 
t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c p r o c e s s e s ,  t h i s 
organizational model embraces sustaining 
change. James Wilson explains,  “changes 
that  are consistent  with  existing task 
definitions [i.e.,  incremental innovation]  will 
be accepted … [and] only  those changes that 
require a  redefinition  of those tasks  [i.e. 
disruptive innovation] will be resisted.”41 
Mintzberg  goes one step further when he 
suggests: 
[ T r a d i t i o n a l  p l a n n i n g ] u s u a l l y 
institutionalized a form of incrementalism 
[with  relation  to planned change] ... 
because incremental  change – change at 
the margin, with limited scope – is 
consistent with  the established orientation 
of the organization, and is planning itself. 
In  contrast, quantum change – which 
means comprehensive reorientation ... 
disrupts all  the established categories of  the 
organization, on which planning depends. 
As a  result, such  change tends to be 
resisted, or more commonly, ignored, in  the 
planning process. 42   
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For  Mintzberg, an organization pays the price 
of having  an  enunciated strategy  with  their 
“ability to change when it must.” 
The “systemic”  homeland security  mission 
appears to be executed in  an  acceptable way. 
Most  of the time there are no casualties 
linked to acts of sabotage against  or 
appropriation  of the critical infrastructure of 
the United States; since the establishment of 
the homeland security  policy,  only  one plane 
has been  used to perpetrate an  attack. In 
2010, a  single-engine plane was deliberately 
directed against  a  government  building in 
Austin,  Texas,  killing  one person  besides the 
pilot  and prompting  a vivid debate about  as 
to whether  or  not  this incident  qualified as an 
act  of terrorism, given  the sui generis 
motivations of the perpetrator (an IRS audit).
If I suggest that the systemic mission 
appears  to be well executed, it  is because 
measuring the success of the homeland 
security  deterrence strategy  takes us into the 
difficult realm  of measuring  the success of a 
negative.  How  do we “tally  the score”  of 
events that  did not  happen because they  were 
deterred by  a systemic approach? What 
statistical  indicators are available to 
determine i f the homeland security 
institutions are doing  a  better  job today  than 
yesterday  and a worse one than  tomorrow 
(the basis of continuous improvement)? And, 
what  is more important,  how  do we know 
that  we are safer  and more secure today  – 
because of all this organizational effort  – 
than before 9/11, our baseline? 
Answering these questions is essential for 
both,  the “incremental”  and the “future 
s h o c k ”  m i s s i o n s , a l b e i t e v e n m o r e 
complicated for  the second,  as I will  later 
demonstrate.
There is, of course, a  simple methodology 
to prove the effectiveness of most homeland 
security  measures to protect  our  security 
environment.  A  controlled experiment could, 
for  example, shut  down all iterative security 
measures at the airports of one state, while 
maintaining  them  at  all the other  airports in 
the United States.  Once all the protections 
and security  protocols in that state were 
removed,  we would just have to measure the 
difference between  the amount  of security 
incidents originating from  those airports 
(even  when  flights crossed state lines),  and 
compare them  with  the control group (the 
rest  of the US) to see if there was a  positive 
difference (i.e., the airports of that  state  were 
more secure) or  a negative difference (i.e.,  the 
airports of that  state where less secure).  This 
is the underlying logic  of the tests used by  the 
pharmaceutical industry  and the FDA  to 
determine the safety  of a drug, or  by  the 
computing  industry  to test the effectiveness 
of the security architecture of their networks.
 A  homemade version  of this test can be 
tried by  anyone: it  would just  be necessary  to 
take a  personal computer  and install a 
version  of Windows XP without Service Pack 
1  and 2,  no firewall and no antivirus program, 
and then  start using  the web with  Explorer 6. 
Then, the experimenter  will  have to wait  and 
see how  long  it  takes for  the computer  to get 
hacked or  infected by  a  virus. After  this test, 
he or  she will  now  know  with  certainty  how 
effective the previous security  measures were. 
(For  my  computer, it never took more than 
three minutes for  the OS kernel to be 
corrupted).
The moral, legal,  and political  implications 
of such  an  experimental  and controlled 
approach  to measure the effectiveness of a 
deterrence strategy  for  homeland security  are 
evident.
A  seemingly  less effective,  but certainly 
more humane alternative to address the task 
of assessing effectiveness has been  developed 
in  the form  of vulnerability  analysis 
methodology  for  critical  infrastructure 
protection, designed to study  and determine 
the best  way  to “allocate limited funding in 
such  a  way  as to minimize overall risk.” 43 
While this methodology  creates a more 
efficient  resource allocation  system  for 
homeland security  funding, the nature of the 
bureaucratic  culture signifies that risk 
reduction will  be perceived through  the lens 
of the continuous improvement  process and 
hence always as an incremental movement. 
As Christensen points out: 
One of  the dilemmas of management is 
that, by  their  very nature, processes are 
established so that  employees perform 
recurrent tasks in a consistent way, time 
after  time. To ensure consistency, they  are 
meant not to change or if  they must change, 
to change through tightly controlled 
procedures. This means that the very 
mechanisms through which organizations 
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create value are intrinsically  inimical to 
change.44
T h e r e f o r e ,  h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
organizations will tend to evaluate critical 
infrastructure protection countermeasures, 
even  the disruptive ones, within the current 
continuous improvement paradigm. This is 
fine for  the systemic  mission,  but  everything 
related to the second mission,  the “future 
shock  mission,”  will  most  probably  be 
d i s c a r d e d ,  b e c a u s e d i s r u p t i v e a n d 
unpredictable  threats posed by  the 
recombining  nature of new  technologies 
cannot be confronted by  incremental 
methodologies. They  are by  definition outside 
of the feedback loop.
In  other words,  for the yet  to be planned 
homeland security  incident that  will use a 
new  combination  of technologies never  tried 
before, the current homeland security 
institutional  framework  cannot  connect the 
dots,  because there are no dots to be 
connected. What  makes Christensen’s 
concept  of disruptive technology  so troubling 
for  administrators all over the world is that 
he clearly  demonstrated that  good planning, 
and not the opposite,  was in  fact  one of the 
main reasons why  big companies failed and 
were crushed by  new  disruptive technologies. 
In  the context  of homeland security  policy, 
t h i s m e a n s t h a t w i t h  t h e c u r r e n t 
organizational  model,  the bureaucracy  might 
get  as good as it  can  possibly  be and still  miss 
the next threat precisely  because it has 
learned to be very  efficient in  its normal 
operation, thus resisting  any  change outside 
its sustaining  processes.  Hierarchical 
iterative bureaucracies are precisely  the worst 
kind of organizations to confront “out-of-the-
process” threats.  
This is why  I stated earlier  that a 
traditional bureaucracy  cannot  be the one 
reacting  to disruptive threats. Instead, to 
fight  this bureaucratic hysteresis the current 
homeland security  institutional design 
(indispensable for  the “systemic mission”) 
has to be complemented with  another  very 
different approach to security  to confront  the 
recombining threats of the permanently 
disrupted environment. A  new  ad-hocratic 
organization, with no direct  involvement  in 
the fight against incremental  threats or  the 
day-to-day  operation  of homeland security 
institutions,  should concentrate its efforts on 
producing  positive homeland security 
disruption to counteract the negative effects 
of the power of “the few.”
PUSHING THE BORDERS OF THE 
IMPOSSIBLE: DISRUPTING 
POSITIVELY THE HOMELAND 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
While  the first  homeland security  “systemic 
mission”  of neutralizing  incremental threats 
seems to be fulfilled in  an  acceptable way  by 
the current  homeland security  institutional 
model, the  second “future shock mission” 
focusing on  counteracting the threat  posed by 
the recombining  of disruptive technologies is 
almost  nonexistent.  In fact,  the relative 
success of the first  mission  is one of the 
biggest  obstacles to accomplishing  effectively 
the second one.  As the homeland security 
bureaucracy  becomes more effective  in 
limiting  the success ratio of incremental 
threats, it  creates a  political environment 
where it  is very  difficult for  the policymaker 
not to keep allocating  more resources to the 
same programs that  appear  to be working, 
therefore sustaining  the investment  cycle. 
This makes it  very  challenging for  the few  to 
repeat  the last  attack, but  it  also focuses the 
limited organizational resources and 
attention  span  on the last  incremental 
s c e n a r i o a n d a w a y  f r o m  t h e n e x t 
(unforeseeable) disruptive attack. Hence, the 
strategic  truism,  which states that  successful 
armies and navies are always preparing  to 
fight the last  war,  has, in this case, 
metaphorical and literal significance. 
In  this security  ecosystem  defined by  the 
accelerated pace of disruptive technological 
recombination, “connecting  the dots”  is not 
an  acceptable strategy  to avoid the next 
threat. Intelligence gathering is not possible 
for  attacks that  have not  yet  been  planned or 
even  conceived,  combining  technologies that 
are or  will  be available, but  were conceived 
for  other  purposes.  Also, while focused 
intelligence plays a  central role for avoiding 
specific threat  scenarios,  once these scenarios 
are identified and hopefully  neutralized they 
become, by  definition, part of the systemic 
mission and an incremental threat. 
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Instead,  homeland security  institutions 
addressing the “future shock mission”  have to 
be able to be proactive and become disruptive 
agents themselves.  In this way,  the state 
would reclaim  the initiative with  innovation 
(instead of fighting  against it),  provoking 
positive environmental  changes through  a 
sustained research  and development  effort. 
Doing  this requires an  organization  shielded 
from  the “systemic mission,”  designed to 
avoid the same things that  make other 
bureaucracies so successful: iteration  and 
incremental processes. 
Administrative reforms have a  bad name 
in  homeland security, probably  because there 
have been so many  of them  in  a  very  short 
amount of time. Wood and Waterman 
established that  political reorganizations 
might  not be enough  to break bureaucratic 
resistance to change when more than  one 
organizational culture exists inside the 
bureaucratic bodies. 45 That  is the case of the 
Department of Homeland Security, where the 
so-called department components (TSA,  CBP, 
the Coast  Guard,  FEMA, Secret  Service, etc.) 
have strong organizational  cultures that 
precede the merger  that created the 
department in 2002.  
It is precisely  for  this reason  that  a  new 
part ia l reorganizat ion  is necessary, 
addressing the limitations of the current 
structure to confront  the “future shock 
m i s s i o n . ”  T h e c u r r e n t  c o m p e t i n g 
organizational cultures of the homeland 
security  bureaucracy  are oriented to 
accomplish  the old missions of the 
department’s individual components,  fighting 
threats in  an  incremental  way.  Any  new  task 
given  to this existing structure will be 
watered down  by  an  older,  more successful, 
more proven  and more consolidated 
organizational ethos. Wilson explains it: 
Tasks that are not part of the culture will 
not be attended to with the same energy 
and resources as are devoted to tasks  that 
are part of it. Second, organizations in 
which  two or  more cultures struggle for 
supremacy will  experience serious conflict 
as defenders of  one seek to dominate 
representatives of the others. Third, 
organizations will resist taking on new 
tasks that  seem incompatible with its 
dominant culture. The stronger  and more 
uniform the culture – that  is, the more the 
culture approximates a sense of  mission – 
the more obvious these consequences.46 
In  the current homeland security 
administration  model ,  research  and 
development efforts are embedded in  the 
“systemic mission”  and most  if not all of its 
current  results are incremental  and not 
disruptive in  nature.  Therefore,  there is no 
incentive to look for  solutions to problems 
that  are not considered part of the 
operational objectives of the  current 
homeland security  environment.  That  is why 
there is so much  interest  and debate 
regarding, for  example,  the development  and 
implementation of the controversial  full body 
scanners (an  incremental  innovation  useful 
to the current  operational  mission of DHS), 47 
and so little interest  in countermeasures for 
security risks that have never been exploited.
 I n  f a c t , M i c h a e l  G r e e n b e r g e r 
demonstrated that  under  the current 
organizational  model,  homeland security’s 
institutions are unresponsive even  to 
technology  solutions that are widely 
available.  He found that  because of 
organizational  limits,  the  Department  of 
Homeland Security  was incapable of 
recognizing  widely  available technology 
solutions to security  threats in  at  least two 
cases: efficient  “see through”  technology  to 
screen  cargo,  and liquid explosive detection 
for  airplane passengers. To combat  this 
resistance, he proposed an institutional 
reform  to create inside DHS a  “Department 
o f H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y  T e c h n o l o g y 
Mobilization Board”  based on  the successful 
mobilizations boards used during  World War 
II to “review  and search out antiterrorism 
technology  and quickly  decide whether the 
new  technology  should be used and promoted 
in  the homeland security  effort.” 48  I would 
like to take this good proactive approach  a 
step further, using as a  model the most 
disruptive institution  for  military  research 
and development  in  the history  of mankind: 
the Defense Advanced Research  Projects 
Agency (DARPA).  
Created in 1958  after  the so-called 
“Sputnik  Crisis,”  when  the American 
government  was taken  by  surprise by  the 
successful  launching  of the Soviet  satellite 
Sputnik, DARPA’s mission  is “to maintain  the 
technological superiority  of the U.S.  military 
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and prevent  technological surprise from 
harming  our  national security  by  sponsoring 
revolutionary,  high-payoff research.” 49 It  is a 
highly  disruptive organization  “with  no 
operational  mission, no service requirements 
and designed to protect  fragile ephemeral 
projects.” 50  It  doesn’t  avoid future shocks 
surprises in  itself,  but tries to create its own 
surprises faster  than its adversaries,  thus 
controlling the pace of military innovation.
An organization  like DARPA  succeeds in 
managing  a  disrupted environment  because it 
does not  negate its disrupted or  disruptive-
prone nature,  but instead uses it  to its 
advantage.  This means that  it  fights surprise 
by  creating surprise, consciously  producing 
as many  environmental  disruptions as it  can. 
When DARPA succeeds,  it forces American 
adversaries into the uncomfortable position 
of being the ones reacting  to American 
military  disruption and trying  to guess the 
next move, robbing  those adversaries of the 
initiative that the few  naturally  tend to enjoy. 
By  doing  this, DARPA  does not counter 
specific future shock surprises, but  it creates 
a  security  environment where US Armed 
Forces have the upper hand. 
As any  investor  knows, high  return and 
high  risk  are directly  correlated. Therefore, 
high  payoff research  and development need a 
higher  institutional tolerance for  risk and 
failure.  Christensen points out  that  because 
“the ultimate uses or  applications for 
disruptive technologies are unknowable in 
advance ...  Failure is an intrinsic step toward 
success.” 51 DARPA’s creative process aims to 
“find an  area of technology  that  could go a 
long  way  toward serving  the needs of the 
country  if improved but  that wasn't  getting 
much  attention in  the private sector,  put 
some wel l -cons idered research  and 
development money  into it  to get  it  on its 
feet,  and then cut  it  loose.” 52 Because of this 
high-risk approach, some of its projects fail  in 
a  way  that  would put in  danger  the career  of 
t h e p r o j e c t  m a n a g e r  i n  a n y  o t h e r 
organization, while others,  like the Advanced 
R e s e a r c h  P r o j e c t s A g e n c y  N e t w o r k 
(ARPANET),  succeed in  forever transforming 
the human environment53.
For  this approach  to work in  the context  of 
homeland security,  it  is essential  to create an 
agency  isolated from  the core requirements of 
the “systemic mission.”  It  would have to be a 
task  oriented research  and development 
organization  designed to positively  disrupt 
the security  environment with  technology 
solutions for  problems not  yet identified by 
“the few.” 
Some, like Joshua  Cooper,  have used the 
metaphor  of an  institutional immune system 
to describe such  an  approach  to defend 
society  against the negative effect  of the 
accelerating  pace of change.  For  him, “this 
constant  surprise,  and the demand it  makes 
for  an  ‘always-on’ defense, is one of the 
reasons we need a  deep-security  immune 
system  instead of an  old-style Grand 
Strategy.” 54  An  evolving  homeland security 
immune system  requires a  risk  management 
approach  to identify  vulnerabilities with low 
investment-high  rewards opportunities to 
close a  technological security  hole while at 
the same time the usability  of the concerned 
technology  is preserved and, if possible, 
enhanced. 
DARPA’s success as the proactive 
component of the Department of Defense 
immune system  is due to the fact that  it  is 
structured as an adhocracy,  a  term  coined by 
Toffler  to describe an  organizational model 
where organic temporary  relations are 
established (hence the ad hoc  part  of the 
name) to respond to a particular  task  (or 
threat) with  very  little  or  no formal  hierarchy 
or  standardized behavior.  An adhocracy  is a 
“fast-moving,  information-rich, kinetic 
organization  of the future,  filled with 
transient  cells and extremely  mobile 
individuals.” 55  Such  a  model for homeland 
security  would create ephemeral  teams of 
experts used to close high risk security  holes 
that  would then  be disbanded to make place 
to another  team  formed to tackle another 
disruptive challenge.
In  fact,  as Christopher Ford identified, 
some of DARPA’s most recent projects have 
already  some unambiguous homeland 
security  implications. 56 The “DARPA  network 
challenge,”  for  example,  showed how  social 
networking  web tools and aggregators can  be 
engaged to gather  data,  mobilize participants, 
foster  collaboration, and build trust,57 in the 
context of multiple homeland security 
missions. 
For  the homeland security  “future shock” 
mission, the challenge is not  only  to pair  a 
disruptive solution  with  a  disruptive 
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problem; even  the problem  definitions 
themselves should be disruptive in nature: 
How  to neutralize  a  threat  that  no one has yet 
identified as a  threat? Thus, the “future 
shock”  prevention effort  must identify 
proactively  security  threats to the human 
environment  provoked by  the recombining  of 
technology  and human social and cultural 
behavior. 
Consequently, this new  homeland security 
institution  would have to invest  an important 
part  of its resources probing disruptive 
security  scenarios, using a “red team” 
m e t h o d o l o g y  t o i d e n t i f y  s e c u r i t y 
shortcomings. These “white hat”  hackers 
would try  to hack the whole United States of 
A m e r i c a t e c h n o l o g y  e n v i r o n m e n t , 
establishing  the mission  requirements for  the 
new  agency.  Only  then, after  a  critical 
technology  has failed this highly  classified 
penetrat ion  test or  a  scenario that 
recombines multiple technologies in  a  novel 
way  has been  identified,  research  and 
development could begin  to find a  minimum 
sufficient response that permits the 
technology  to operate as efficiently  as before 
but closes preventively  the security  hole. 
While this proactive approach  will  not 
identify  every  recombining  threat, it will add 
a  new  layer  of disruption and innovation  to 
the human  ecosystem  on  top of the ones that 
are already  in place, but  this time under  the 
direct control of the homeland security 
institutions.
Because there is no bigger  threat  to 
America’s interests than  the loss of 
competitiveness caused by  crippling  its 
critical sectors in  the name of pointless 
security  measures – something akin  to an 
autoimmune disease if we extend the 
metaphor  a  little bit  more – the concept of a 
“Minimum  Sufficient  Response”  is essential. 
In  fact, for  the effort  to be successful and 
sustainable, most of the tasks should be dual-
purpose,  enhancing (rather than  the 
opposite) the usability  of the concerned 
technology. This would also have a  protective 
effect  on American  civil liberties and human 
rights, by  limiting  the scope of the security 
procedures. If done properly, this new  actor 
in  the homeland security  environment would 
identify  unproductive and bloated security 
solutions where a  risk management  approach 
is absent  (i.e.  a  layer  of security  that  does 
nothing  to enhance the resilience of a 
technology), and could propose the necessary 
changes to improve the usability  of the 
system.
W h i l e i n c r e m e n t a l r e s e a r c h  a n d 
development is an  essential  part  of the 
“systemic mission,”  this new  organization 
should be isolated from  them.  If an  attack by 
the few  does occur,  the technological  solution 
needed to avoid such an  event in  the future 
should not  be  the responsibility  of this new 
institution. Once a real “red team”  has made 
explicit  the exploitable  vulnerability, fixing  it 
has become an  incremental  and not  a 
disruptive challenge.
Proving the effectiveness of this new 
institutional  approach  will be difficult  and 
will require “out  of the box”  managerial  and 
political skills. To demonstrate this,  I offer  to 
the reader  a  thought experiment: Imagine 
that  an  organization  like the one I am 
describing  existed in 1997.  In  1998,  the 
organization’s red teams identified the 
cockpit doors of commercial  airplanes as 
weak links in  the security  environment  of the 
transportation  sector  for  many  scenarios, 
none of which  looked like the 9/11  terrorist 
attacks.58  Then, multidisciplinary  research 
and development teams identified a 
Minimum  Sufficient Response technology 
solution: by  armoring  the cockpit  doors and 
making  it impossible for  the pilot  to open 
them  while airborne – even  if he or  she wants 
to (in  case the criminal actors try  to blackmail 
him  or her  by  holding  hostage a  passenger  or 
a  flight attendant) – no asymmetrical actor 
would be able to gain control of the airliner, 
closing the security hole. 
If such  a  process would have taken  place, 
we would never  know  that something  as 
costly  as 9/11  was deterred, but  we would 
have taken  advantage of a  low  investment-
high  reward opportunity  to “upgrade” the 
United States security  ecosystem  in  a 
disruptive way,  leaving  mostly  unaffected the 
usability  of the technology.  I use the 9/11 
example because it is a  disruptive threat that 
has already  been  identified and mostly 
neutralized by  precisely  this kind of solution 
(the most  cost  effective measure of all  the 
preventive solutions identified by  the 9/11 
commission  report).59 It also shows how  hard 
it  would it be to measure the effectiveness of 
a  procedure that might  deter  a  catastrophic 
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event  if that  event  never  takes place because 
of our actions.       
Finally,  because what I am  proposing  here 
is a  DARPA  inspired model  for  the problem 
o f a d a p t i n g t h e h o m e l a n d s e c u r i t y 
organizational  framework to respond to the 
power  of “the few,”  it  is necessary  to explain 
why  I do not consider  the existing  HSARPA  a 
sufficient solution.  First,  HSARPA lacks the 
proper  funding needed to have the  same 
positive effect that DARPA  has had for 
research  and development. 60  Second, 
HSARPA  is devoting  most  of those resources 
to research incremental  solutions to 
incremental problems.  The HSARPA mission 
specifically  states that it  was created to 
“enhance departmental operations.”61 
Because of this,  HSARPA  is not capable of 
addressing the “future shock mission.”  One 
employee of the science and technology 
directorate at DHS described HSARPA to me 
as an  agency  “suffocating”  inside of the 
D e p a r t m e n t  o f H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y 
bureaucratic structure. For  an organization to 
be successful at confronting disruptive 
technologies,  strong evidence suggests that 
an  independent small organization is needed 
to escape the gravitational field of the 
incremental mission  of the bigger  institution 
and its organizational  culture.62  Currently, 
most if not all  of the HSARPA  projects are 
sustaining research  and development 
programs pivoting  around the operational 
missions of the Department  of Homeland 
Security. 
CONCLUSION
The expressed objective of this article was to 
define the rapid pace of technology’s 
evolution  and its recombining nature as two 
primal  forces that shape the homeland 
security  environment  in  a way  that has 
lowered the barriers to entry  for  disruption 
by  small groups of actors that  I called here 
“ t h e f e w . ”  B e c a u s e o f t h i s r e c e n t 
phenomenon, high  tech  societies require a 
security  strategy  to react  to the threats that 
arise from  this amoral phenomenon, and to 
preserve innovation  opportunities and 
freedom  of usability  for  new  technologies.  In 
the United States,  this mission stands on  the 
shoulders of the homeland security 
institutional framework,  which  is a 
consequence of a  catastrophic  “power  of the 
few” attack. 
 It  was also my  intention to demonstrate 
how  the dual nature of innovat ion 
(incremental  and disruptive) creates very 
dif ferent  chal lenges to the security 
environment.  While  homeland security 
institutions seem  to be dealing effectively 
with  the incremental  threats,  the current 
model  offers no real response to the 
disruptive ones.  This has a  clear  and 
dangerous negative effect  on  the American 
strategic  process,  penalizing  disruptive 
solutions to disruptive threats, and 
privileging an  incremental approach to 
security  planning. Because both are needed,  a 
new  institutional  framework  should be 
instituted to take advantage of the proven 
s u p e r i o r i t y  o f a d h o c r a t i c  a d a p t i v e 
organizations to deal with  unpredictable, 
chaotic  environments.  By  adding a  new  layer 
of positive disruption  to the environment, 
positive and unpredictable  innovation  would 
provide the best possible antidote to negative 
innovation  and the illicit  appropriation of 
technology. 
America  has been  built  on  the belief that 
the future will be better  than  the past  and 
that  the best  way  to harness progress is to 
allow  people to experiment  and think freely. 
Protecting  the homeland must  become a 
synonym  for  protecting those foundational 
values, by  making sure that positive 
technological recombination  is available for 
all,  and people can  embrace and not be afraid 
of this permanently  disrupted human 
environment.
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